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Stories about growing religious intolerance in Indonesia have frequently made 
headlines around the world in recent years. The arrest and subsequent imprisonment 
of the Christian governor of Jakarta for blasphemy; Ahmadis being assaulted and 
murdered; the persecution of Shia communities; or a smartphone app released by the 
Indonesian government through which concerned citizens can report suspected cases 
of religious heresy, have all reinvigorated the debate about how tolerant the Muslim 
majority is vis-à-vis religious minorities in the archipelago state. 
Most of the scholarship that has emerged from this debate has focused on the years 
since the collapse of the New Order dictatorship in 1998. Arguably because of the 
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rather narrow timeframe of these analyses, the argument that democratization ushered 
in by the demise of the Suharto regime has allowed for the politicization of religion 
and consequently led to a decline in tolerant attitudes vis-à-vis minority groups across 
Indonesia, has come to feature prominently in this debate. 
Jeremy Menchik’s book examines social attitudes vis-à-vis religious minority groups 
in Indonesia over a much longer period. Such a broad focus therefore has the potential 
to add important new insights to the current debate. 
In the first part of his book, Menchik examines how Islamic organizations in 
Indonesia understand tolerance. The second part of the book explores why Islamic 
organizations have developed their respective understanding of tolerance. The final 
part of the book develops a “historical constructivist” approach to the study of politics 
and religion, which “attempts to transcend the narrative of a teleological progression 
from traditional societies to a modernity organized around secular democracy and the 
liberal virtue of tolerance” (p. 6). 
Menchik’s book contributes to the scholarly debate in three important ways. The first 
finding is that local conditions, not ideological dogma, determine attitudes towards 
religious minorities. Concretely, Menchik analyzes the attitudes of religious leaders in 
three different organizations over a period of one hundred years. The first 
organization he examines is Muhammadiyah, a reformist Sunni Islam group, which 
was founded in Central Java in 1912. It is the second largest Islamic organization in 
Indonesia with 29 million members. The second organization Menchik examines with 
regard to the attitudes of its religious leaders vis-à-vis religious minorities is Persatuan 
Islam, usually referred to as Persis in Indonesia. It was founded in West Java in 1923. 
Finally, Menchik examines Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist Sunni Islam group that 
was founded in East Java in 1926, and with between 40 and 90 million members, is 
the largest independent Islamic organization in the world. 
To identify and explain the attitudes of leaders within these organizations towards 
religious minorities, Menchik looks at “micro practices” as expressed in “discussions 
about the orientation of prayer houses, funeral rituals, the classification and 
hierarchical ranking of sacred texts, and the appropriate behaviour for interactions 
with non-Muslim” (p. 38) in the decades prior to the formation of these organizations. 
His analysis of these micro practices between 1880 and 1930 shows that attitudes 
towards religious minorities developed in different directions in Central Java, West 
Java and East Java respectively because ethnic and religious cleavages in these 
regions differed considerably. In areas where Christian missionaries were vocal and 
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visible, the reaction of local Islamic leaders was sharp and decisively anti-Christian. 
In areas where Christian missionaries were less present but where new Islamic 
movements called for reforms, a cleavage within the Islamic community emerged, 
pitting reformers against traditionalists. In these areas, Christians were often seen as 
potential allies by established religious elites in their fight to preserve the status quo 
against calls for reform of existing ecclesiastical structures. Finally, ethnicity 
influenced these different dynamics to the degree that it exacerbated cleavages when 
ethnic identities aligned with individual Islamic organizations but contained tensions 
when members of different religious groups had the same ethnic background. 
These different local conditions during the formative years of Muhammadiyah, Persis, 
and Nahdlatul Ulama explain why their leaders developed attitudes towards Christians 
that are semi-tolerant, intolerant and tolerant respectively. 
These different attitudes where then locked-in in the 1930s (p. 23) and remained 
stable for the next few decades.  Surveys Menchik conducted with leaders of these 
groups in 2010 showed that levels of tolerance vis-à-vis religious minorities were very 
similar to those in place in the early 20th century. 
The second contribution of Menchik’s book is a critique of current scholarship on 
religion in Indonesia that talks about a rise of intolerance vis-à-vis religious minorities 
as a result of democratization. Menchik’s comparative historical analysis shows how 
intolerance towards certain religious groups is not a product of the political opening 
that ensued after the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998. Rather, the othering 
of certain religious minorities has been at the core of what Menchik calls “godly 
nationalism” on which the Indonesian nation state is built. The discrimination of 
religious minorities, in other words, not only has a long tradition in Indonesia, but 
was, if perhaps not a necessity, an inevitable part of nation-state building as the 
archipelago transitioned from an artificial colonial construct called the Dutch East 
Indies to an independent Indonesia. “[F]ocusing on the ideological origins of 
intolerance overlooks the productive, community-forming practices that acts of 
exclusion make possible,” Menchik shows (68). 
The third contribution is an invitation to understand “tolerance” in ways that differ 
from how Western liberalism has conceptualized (and propagated) it. Menchik shows 
that in Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority democracy and third largest democracy 
in the world, a form of “communal tolerance” has developed among majority Muslim 
organizations. This form of tolerance differs from secular-liberal concepts of tolerance 
inasmuch as it prioritizes communal rights over individual rights; propagates 
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communal self-governance based on legal pluralism; insists on a separation of 
religious and social affairs, and places faith above other values (p. 146). 
While the historical comparative focus of the book allows Menchik to make important 
contributions to the scholarly literature on the role of religion in politics in general and 
the role of Islam in democratizing Indonesia in particular, several aspects of his 
argument will have to be examined in more detail in future research. For instance, 
Menchik could have said more about how the attitudes of Muhammadiyah, Persis and 
NU leaders towards religious minorities that formed before 1930 were then preserved 
and transmitted over more than 80 years to eventually shape the views of religious 
leaders in the post-New Order period. While the book makes references to “Islamic 
jurisprudence,” “patterns of political alliance” and “state institutions,” it never really 
explains why and how attitudes of leaders in these organizations remained so stable. 
Not only would it have been important to trace these processes in more detail to live 
up to the author’s promise to provide a “comparative historical analysis of three 
Islamic organizations over a period of one hundred years” (p. 24), but also to gain an 
understanding of how and why the attitudes towards non-Muslim communities stayed 
stable for several decades despite a rapidly changing socio-economic and political 
environment during this period. 
Furthermore, and related to the point above, Menchik’s argument is based on the 
assumption that attitudes towards religious minorities are stable within Islamic 
organizations across the archipelago. Existing works on these organizations suggests 
that this is not the case, however. As scholars such as Greg Fealy and others have 
shown, boarding schools in West Java affiliated with traditionalist organizations such 
as NU were noted for their conservatism and intolerant attitudes towards religious 
minorities. Even if one were to subscribe to the argument that growing intolerance 
within NU ranks is a recent phenomenon,[1]one would still have to explain how the 
NU or Muhammadiyah leadership imposed discipline with regard to tolerance towards 
minorities on such vast organizations until recently. 
Finally, Menchik’s critique of scholarship that has associated the persecution of 
religions minorities with the democratic opening since 1998 feels forced. His 
argument that intolerance towards certain religious minorities has been present since 
Indonesia became independent in 1949 because the othering of religious minorities is 
at the heart of the country’s “godly nationalism,” does not refute research findings that 
have seen an uptick of intolerant attitudes since the country became a democracy once 
more in 1998. While intolerance vis-à-vis groups such as the Ahmadi may always 
have been present in Indonesia, is it possible that the political opening after 1998 has 
allowed such sentiments to be expressed more visibly and vocally? 
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Overall, Jeremy Menchik has delivered a study that is rich in empirical detail and 
makes important theoretical contributions to both Indonesian studies and comparative 
politics more broadly. Especially his call to employ less of a Eurocentric view when 
conducting research on the role of religion in politics should be taken to heart by both 
area specialists and scholars working within mainstream political science. 
[1] See, for instance, Alex Arifianto. 2018. Nahdlatul Ulama is home to its own 
hardliners, New Mandala (8 August). 
 
